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Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Kent School Corporation Inc., 
__Fed. Appx.__, 2014 WL 7011937 (2d Cir. Dec. 15, 2014). 
 
Lindsey M. West 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
affirmed dismissal of three consolidated actions of the 
Schaghticoke Tribal Nation claiming the Schaghticoke had been 
dispossessed of Indian land without the approval of Congress, a 
violation of the Nonintercourse Act. The court found the district 
court correctly deferred under the primary jurisdiction doctrine to 
the United States Department of Interior’s determination that the 
Schaghticoke did not qualify for tribal status. Additionally, the 
district court properly relied on the Department of Interior’s factual 
findings in holding the Schaghticoke presented insufficient 
evidence to establish a prima facie violation of the Nonintercourse 
Act. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Second Circuit found the lower court appropriately 
dismissed the Schaghticoke Tribal Nation’s (“Schaghticoke”) 
consolidated claims that they had been dispossessed of land in 
violation of the Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177.1 The 
consolidated actions were stayed in 1999 while the Schaghticoke 
completed the Department of Interior’s (“DOI”) federal 
acknowledgment process.2 After the DOI’s decision to deny the 
Schaghticoke tribal status was upheld on appeal,3 the Schaghticoke 
pursued these consolidated actions.4 The court affirmed the lower 
court’s reliance on DOI’s factual findings in holding that the 
Schaghticoke did not establish a prima facie case of a violation of 
the Nonintercourse Act.5 Specifically, the lower court found the 
Schaghticoke did not show that it was “united in a community 
under one leadership or government.”6 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Kent School Corp. Inc., 2014 WL 7011937, *1, 
(2d Cir. Dec. 15, 2014) [hereinafter STN III]. 
2
 Id.  
3
  Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Kempthorne, 587 F.3d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 2009) 
[hereinafter STN I].  
4
 STN III, 2014 WL 7011937, at *1. 
5
 Id.  
6
 Id. 
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II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
A. Bureau of Indian Affairs Determination 
 
In 2005, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) issued a 
reconsidered final determination7 declining to recognize 
Schaghticoke’s “tribal existence.”8  Pursuant to the Administrative 
Procedures Act, Schaghticoke appealed the BIA’s decision.9 The 
district court upheld BIA’s determination that the Schaghticoke 
failed to satisfy the criteria for “community” and “political 
influence or authority” necessary under controlling regulations10 
because a substantial portion of the Schaghticoke refused to enroll 
as tribal members.11 
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the Schaghticoke argued 
that the DOI’s decision was the product of improper political 
influence.12  Despite recognition that Connecticut’s governor and 
attorney general expressed to DOI officials “adamant opposition” 
and introduced a bill titled the “Schaghticoke Acknowledgment 
Repeal Act,” the Second Circuit affirmed that there was no 
evidence that the agency was improperly influenced.13  In addition, 
the Court affirmed the district court’s decision that the DOI had 
not violated the Vacancies Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. § 3345 
(“VRA”).14  The VRA provides that “only the head of [the] 
Executive agency may perform any function or duty.”15 The 
Schaghticoke claimed the DOI violated this statutory obligation 
when the Secretary of the Interior appointed the Assistant Deputy 
Secretary to conduct the acknowledgment process, instead of the 
principal deputy. The Second Circuit held that the Secretary of 
Interior properly appointed the “authorized representative” who 
ultimately denied acknowledgement of the Schaghticoke’s tribal 
status.16 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.17  
                                                 
7
 Reconsidered Final Determination To Decline To Acknowledge the 
Schaghticoke Tribal Nation, 70 Fed. Reg. 60101 (Oct. 14, 2005). 
8
 STN I, 587 F.3d at 134. 
9
 United States v. 43.47 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situated in the County of 
Litchfield, Town of Kent, 896 F. Supp. 2d 151 (D. Conn. 2012) [hereinafter STN 
II]. 
10
 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(b)-(c) (2012). 
11
 STN II, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 155. 
12
 STN I, 587 F.3d at 134. 
13
 Id. 
14
 Id at 135. 
15
 Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 3348 (2012)). 
16
 Id. 
17
 Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Salazar, 131 S. Ct. 127 (2010). 
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B. District Court Decision 
 
The Schaghticoke’s claimed in the three consolidated 
actions before the district court that their land had been wrongfully 
conveyed in violation of the Nonintercourse Act.18 The lead case, 
U.S. v. 43.47 Acres, is a condemnation action by the federal 
government under eminent domain to quiet title to two parcels of 
land totaling 126.99 acres.19 The two other cases are land claim 
actions by the Schaghticoke against defendants who have current 
ownership interests in the land.20 Relying on DOI’s factual 
findings, the district court held the Schaghticoke had failed to 
establish a prima facie case under the Nonintercourse Act because 
the Schaghticoke could not prove it was a tribe under federal 
common law.21  Further, the court found the Schaghticoke was 
collaterally estopped from litigating its status as an Indian tribe 
under the Nonintercourse Act because the group was bound by 
DOI’s determination denying its tribal existence.22 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
The Nonintercourse Act states “[n]o purchase, grant, lease, 
or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from 
any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law 
or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered 
into pursuant to the Constitution.”23  Establishing a prima facie 
case under the Nonintercourse Act requires, as a threshold 
question, that the Schaghticoke qualify as an Indian tribe.24  
Applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the Second Circuit 
found the district court’s reliance on the DOI’s factual findings in 
denying the Schaghticoke tribal status was proper, and that the 
Shaghticoke therefore could not establish a prima facie violation of 
the Nonintercourse Act.25  The primary jurisdiction doctrine is a 
“judicial doctrine whereby a court tends to favor allowing an 
agency an initial opportunity to decide an issue in a case in which 
the court and the agency have concurrent jurisdiction.”26   
 
                                                 
18
 STN II, 896 F. Supp. 2d at 154. 
19
 Id.  
20
 Id. 
21
 Id. at 158. 
22
 Id. at 162. 
23
 Id. at 154 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012)). 
24
 Id. at 156 (quoting Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 39 
F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
25
 STN III, 2014 WL 7011937, at *1. 
26
 Id. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1310 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 9th ed. 
2009)). 
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To constitute a tribe under the Nonintercourse Act, a group 
must show under the standard annunciated in Montoya v. U.S., that 
it is a “community under one leadership or government.”27 In 
contrast, DOI regulations require a group meet seven criteria to 
qualify, including that (1) a predominant portion of the petitioning 
group comprises a distinct community and have existed as a 
community from historical times until the present; and (2) the 
petitioner has maintained political influence or authority over its 
members as an autonomous entity from historical times until the 
present.28  The court found that the district court properly deferred 
to DOI’s factual findings in holding the Schaghticoke had 
presented insufficient evidence to satisfy the Montoya standard 
because they were only a distinct community from 1920 to 1967 
and after 1996, and lacked “political influence or authority over 
tribal members.”29  Finally, the court declined to address whether 
the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies here because it was 
moot.30  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
 Although the DOI’s criteria in recognizing a tribe is much 
more strict than the common law standard under the 
Nonintercourse Act, the Second Circuit held the district court 
properly deferred to the DOI’s factual findings under the primary 
jurisdiction doctrine in holding that the Schaghticoke Nation was 
not entitled to tribal status. Thus, the Schaghticoke will continue 
their quest for federal recognition.31  
                                                 
27
 Id. (quoting Montoya v. U.S., 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901)).  
28
 Id. (citing 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(b)-(c)). 
29
 Id. at *2.  
30
 Id. 
31
 See Shaghticoke Tribal Nation’s website, Schaghticoke Tribal Nation, 
http://www.schaghticoke.com (accessed Feb. 8, 2015). 
